Article Analysis: Foreign Bank Penetration to Nordic Market

Article Analysis: Foreign Bank Penetration to Nordic Market ABDULAZEEZ OLUWAFUNMIKE ASMAU ASSIGNMENT: Journals of international financial markets, institutions and money, vol.11 (1); 53-63 by Engwals, L., Marquardt, R., Pedersen,T. and Adrian E Tschoegl (2001)‘foreign bank penetration to the newly opened market in the Nordic countries. To explain the aims of the research and how the researcher carried out theses aims. Critically analyse the article from a methodology perspective. (1000 WORDS) Abstract This work is based on the research articles of Lars Engwall, Rolf Marquardt, Torben Pedersen, Adrian E Tschoegl (2001). The authors research is to determine the impact of foreign bank in the newly opened market in some Nordic countries which includes Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The opening of foreign bank in these Nordic country provides them with the opportunity to study the analysis of the foreign bank sector in the case where the sector had a specific start date. Three hypothesis were examined and the result leads to how parent market and the difficulty facing the domestic competition is fully in agreement in the situations of Denmark, for Finland and Norway it’s mixed and indeterminate, and fully disagree in the situation of Sweden. The result were consistently with the Stiglits – Weiss argument that the foreign banks bought entry by accepting worse lending risks. (Engwals, L., Marquardt, R., Pedersen,T. and Tschoegl, A., E. 2001). Introduction This research focuses on how foreign bank gain access to the newly opened market in some Nordic countries. Denmark in 1971 was the first to deregulate its domestic banking markets and the entry of foreign banks. Just one foreign bank entered initially and the number of foreign banks grew slowly over time. Finland opened next (1978) but no foreign banks entered until four years later when further deregulation made entry attractive. Norway (1984) and Sweden (1985) opened after Denmark in more than a decade and a number of banks all entered at once. After falling from its peaks, the number of foreign banks and their share of each countrys banking system assets are recovering. (Lars Engwall, Rolf Marquardt, Torben Pedersen, Tschoegl, A., E. 2001). Foreign bank was developed with the evolution of an economy or a technology in the Nordic countries not until the government removed the barriers. Opening up to foreign bank in Nordic countries exist to the process of deregulation which leads to competitive turbulence. Foreign banking was welcome by the authorities for the competition and also new capabilities which they establish to the domestic market. However, the effect of the entrant on monetary policy, credit control and soundness of the existing domestic banks are the concerns of the authorities. (Engwals, L., Marquardt, R., Pedersen,T. and Adrian E Tschoegl 1999). The objective state to examine the determinant of the evolution of the foreigner market share of the asset of the banking system as a whole, not the survival and success of the individual banks. The three hypotheses related to the determinant of foreign bank sectors was formulated, which they relates the foreign banks’ market share to a time trend, to each host countrys trade balance, and to the banking systems loan loss experience. (Engwals, L., Marquardt, R., Pedersen,T. and A,. E,Tschoegl 2001). The first variable captures learning and selection, the second proxies for access to business related to the foreign banks’ access to their home markets. And the last captures the effect of a possible crisis-induced lack of competitiveness of the host-country banks. The result shows that in Denmark it is fully in agreement, for Finland and Norway it’s mixed and indeterminate, and fully disagree in the case of Sweden.(Engwals, L., Marquardt, R., Pedersen,T. and Tschoegl, A., E. 2001). Literature reviews Foreign direct investment in banking has drawn substantial theoretical and empirical attention over the last two decade and empirical attention. Engwals, L., Marquardt, R., Pedersen,T. and Adrian E Tschoegl(2001), Williams (1997) provides a comprehensive survey of the theoretical literature. However, the literature on the market share of the foreign banks is sparse and almost entirely cross-sectional in nature. Some other authors like Walter (1992) argue that bank-oriented financial systems are hostile to new entry, whether that of banks or markets. In line with Walter’s argument, Steinherr and Huveneers (1994) provide evidence that foreign bank penetration of loan markets is lower in countries where a small number of domestic banks dominate the banking sector. Yafeh and Yosha (1995) propose a model in which domestic banks respond to foreign bank entry by increasing the resources that the domestic banks devote to the formation of ties with firms. (Engwals, L., Marquardt, R., Pedersen,T. and A., E, Tschoegl 2001). Hypotheses The literature reviewed provides the basis for the three hypotheses about the influences of learning, access to parent-country related business, and the effect of impediments to the competitiveness of host-country banks. The foreign banks can be subject both to selection and evolutionary learning (Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman 1995). (Engwals, L., Marquardt, R., Pedersen,T. and A., E. Tschoegl 2001). Firstly, the time trend captures a second effect that has a debateable implication for the sign of the variable. (Engwals, L., Marquardt, R., Pedersen,T. and A., E. Tschoegl 2001). H1: The longer foreign banks have been present, the larger their market share. Second, they expect the foreign banks’ market share of banking system assets in a country to correlate positively with imports to the country and negatively with exports (Heinkel and Levi 1992). (Engwals, L., Marquardt, R., Pedersen,T. and A., E. Tschoegl 2001) H2: The market share of foreign banks should wax with a trade deficit and wane with a trade surplus. Lastly, financial crises should correlate positively with an expanded role for the foreign banks. (Engwals, L., Marquardt, R., Pedersen,T. and A., E. Tschoegl 2001). H3: The foreign banks’ market share should wax when domestic banks are facing loan losses and wane when the domestic banks are less burdened. Methodology and Result OLS regression was use to examine the three hypotheses with time trend, trade balance losses and the financial crisis) the three hypotheses served has an independence variances. Their results shows that in Demark all three independent variables had the correct sign and all were statistically significant at the 5% level and beta coefficients from the regression on the standardized variables shows TIME as the most important variable and TRADE BALANCE having a larger effect than LOSSES. (Engwals, L., Marquardt, R., Pedersen,T. and Tschoegl, A., E. 2001). In Finland country, TIME had the correct sign, but the other two variables had perverse signs. All three variables had a large impact in the sense that a one standard deviation change in the independent variable. As for Norway, TIME was the only important factor. For Sweden, TIME had a negative effect but was not an important factor. (Engwals, L., Marquardt, R., Pedersen,T. and Tschoegl, A., E. 2001). Conclusion In all four Nordic countries, the survival rate among the initial foreign entrants appears low. Absent acquisitions of domestic banks, the foreign banks have not carved out a large role in any of the four Nordic countries. The result is consistent with what they would expect from theory based on the role of relationships in banking and from Steinherr and Huveneer’s (1994) argument and empirical results. The difference is congruent with differences in the elapsed time since opening; to recapitulate, the order of opening to foreign banks was Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. (Engwals, L., Marquardt, R., Pedersen,T. and A., E. Tschoegl 2001). Word count; 1007 Bibliography Engwals, L., Marquardt, R., Pedersen,T. and Adrian E Tschoegl (2001) ‘foreign bank penetration to the newly opened market in the Nordic countries, ’Journals of international financial markets, institutions and money, vol.11 (1); 53-63. Engwals, L., Marquardt, R., Pedersen,T. and Adrian E Tschoegl (March, 1999) ‘foreign bank penetration to the newly opened market in the Nordic countries. pg. (1-38) 1 Does the EU Suffer From a Democratic Deficit? | Essay Does the EU Suffer From a Democratic Deficit? | Essay The overall goal of EU integration has been to create an ever closer union in which decision are taken as closely as possible to the citizen (Cini, Michele, Borragan, 2010). However, still the most enthusiastic backers of the EU must accept that it has been more a progression commencing and sustained by elites, than by a popular front for change. The claim that the standard European citizen has virtually no possibility of directly affecting the work of the EU, along with the negative impact of integration on popular support for the EU, has given rise to the term the democratic deficit. Although there is no one single definition, the concept behind the notion of the democratic deficit is that decisions in the EU are insufficiently representative of, or accountable to, the nations and the people of Europe (Lord, C, 2001, p165). It is not merely an additional layer of governance, further removed from the peoples of Europe but as a result of such an organisation, each Member State can n o longer claim to be the source of its own legitimacy (Eriksen, Fossum, 2002, p401). It is important to make a distinction between two different types of theories behind the democratic deficit. The institutional perspective focuses on the institutional power sharing and on institutional reform as a solution to the perceived problems of EU level democracy (Cini, 2010, p378). The socio-psychological viewpoint, however, places much emphasis on the lack of a European civic identity and the absence of a European demos. The classical argument, through a socio-psychological point of view, of cases where it can be said that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit is that the nonexistence of representative and direct democracy within the EU. The set up of the EU results in policy-making being dominated at the European level by executive actors, state based ministers in the Council, and government appointments in the Commission. This does not inevitably lead to democratic deficit; unless, as happens, the decisions taken by the executive departments at the European stage are outside the authority of domestic parliaments. Even with the creation of European Affairs Committees in every national parliament, ministers when conversing and voting in the Council, national representatives when constructing policies in The Council and bureaucrats in the Commission when drafting or implementing legislation, are much more isolated from national parliamentary scrutiny and control than are national cabinet ministers or bureaucrats in the domestic policy-making process (Follesdal, Andreas, Hix, Simon, 2005, p2). As a consequence, governments are able to successfully disregard their parliaments when deciding upon policies at the European level. Therefore, European integration has resulted in a reduction of the influence of national parliaments and an enhancement to the authority of executives. Perhaps the institution to come in for the heaviest criticism from the Eurosceptics is the Commission which is seen as an archetypal undemocratic institution, in that it is a civil service composed of appointed members (Cini 2010, p381), who contain extensive policy-making powers. In spite of its authority over initiating and developing new European laws, the Commission is subject to little direct or even indirect public accountability (McCormick, John, 2008, p124). Appointments have to be accepted by Parliament, but apart from that they are made lacking reference to the electorate. The President of the Commission is selected as an outcome of behind the scenes bargaining and conciliations directed by the leaders of the member states. The commission also stands for the views of the EU in numerous international forums devoid of a mandate from the citizens. Moreover, there are very modest openings for people to take part in or contribute to the deliberations of the Commission and only l imited occasions for the EP to hold it accountable for its decisions; although this has increased, being seen most clearly by the parliaments new powers under the Lisbon Treaty. Secondly and associated to the first aspect, the majority of commentators on the democratic deficit claim that the European Parliament authority is insufficient. The movement of legislative powers from national parliaments to the EU institutions has not been matched by an equivalent degree of democratic accountability and legislative input on the part of the European Parliament (EP) (Cini 2010, p380), the solitary directly elected body at EU level. In the 1980s, many analysts argued that there was a direct trade-off between the powers of the European Parliament and the powers of national parliaments (Follesdal, Hix, p 4), where any addition to the authority of the European Parliament would result in a concomitant decrease in the powers of national parliaments (Holland, 1980). However, by the 1990s, such an argument had departed as academics began to understand European integration as a decline in the authority of parliaments at the national level relative to executive powers. The ans wer, most claimed, was to increase the power of the European Parliament relative to the governments in the Council and the Commission (Williams, S. (1991). One of the key the arguments against the claim that authority has moved to the executive, is that national governments are the most directly accountable politicians in Europe. As Moravcsik claims The democratically elected governments of the Member States, dominate the still largely territorial and intergovernmental structure of the EU (Moravcsik Andre, 2002, p112). According to this argument, the EU is still principally an intergovernmental institution; where the verdicts at the European Council and the Council of Ministers are as accountable to EU general public as the policies of national cabinets. Furthermore the New Lisbon Treaty has increased the national parliaments capacity to contribute along with the European institutions in the work of the EU. A new clause clearly sets out the rights and duties of the national parliaments within the EU. It deals with their right to information, the way they monitor subsidiarity, and for reforming the treaties.The EU can be seen to strength en the state, challenging arguments of a democratic deficit, as the democratically elected national executives play an increasingly dominant role in the EU. Against the claims that the executives are outside the power of elected institutions, the most noteworthy institutional progress in the EU from the 1980s, has been the enlarged influence of the EP in the legislative progression and in the appointment of the Commission. The EP now has veto-power over the choice of the Commission and is progressively more prepared to employ its muscle against heavy lobbying from national governments, as was seen with the Parliaments veto of the first proposed line-up of the Barroso Commission in October 2004 (Follesdal, Hix, p 20). Also, the alterations in the use of the co-decision procedure which started under the Maastricht Treaty of 1996 and has only been increased by the last three treaties, has developed from the idea of merely cooperation first commencing under the SEA in 1986, legislation cannot be passed under the co-decision procedure without majority support in both the Council and the European Parliament (Follesdal, Hix, p 22). The extensio n of the co-decision procedure can be seen in the areas including legal immigration, penal judicial cooperation (Eurojust, crime prevention, alignment of prison standards, offences and penalties), police cooperation (Europol) and some aspects of trade policy and agriculture. It can therefore be argued that the EU has addressed the democratic deficit by significantly increasing the powers of the EP and in giving it a role in almost all lawmaking, in turn weakening the powers of the less representative institutions. Despite the extension of the co-decision procedure under The Lisbon Treaty it remains true that the EP does not possess several of the powers of a real legislature. For one it is unable to increase revenues or initiate novel laws and has a highly restricted ability to keep the Commission accountable for its judgments. While the EP may have the ability to veto national governments selection for the Commission President and the group of the Commissioners, the governments rem ain the agenda-setters with regards to the appointments of the Commission and in any new policy implemented in the EU. The trouble with the institutional approaches to the democratic deficit is that they ignore the equally significant socio-psychological viewpoints of this uncharted occurrence. The bigger dilemma is the connection, or lack of it, between the rising democratic politics inside the EU institutions and the opinions of the public. In spite of the rising influence of the EP, there are no European elections, largely as a result of there being no European demos. EU citizens vote for their governments, who represent them in the Council and nominate Commissioners. EU citizens also elect the EP. Nevertheless, none of the domestic elections neither the EP elections are actually European; elections: they are not fought over the personalities and parties at the European level or the direction of the EU policy agenda (Follesdal, Hix, p 4). State based elections are about national as opposed to European concerns, as parties collude to keep the issue of Europe off the domestic agenda (Hix, S, 1999, p 78). EP elections also tend to be decided on issues unrelated to Europe, as parties and the media treat them as mid-term national contests (Follesdal, Hix, p7), this can be shown recently by the success of many radical fringe parties in the 2009 election as a sign of discontent with the political elite and the failures of many government parties, notably the Labour party in the UK. Protest votes as a way of voicing displeasure with parties in government and increasingly failing turnout at European elections signify that as described of the first EP elections as second-order national contests (Reif K, Schmitt H, 1980, p44), is increasingly relevant. Although many national states have also endured their own form of democratic deficit, the perception remains that the trouble is considerably stronger in the EU, which has given way to a disturbing detachment between the EU institutions and its citizens. Psychologically, the EU is so unlike the national democratic bodies that citizens struggle to identify with it. As a result the institutions often appear distant and mysterious, meaning it is certainly not unexpected that anti-European media are capable of engendering public suspicion and resentment towards the EU. The Lisbon Treaty has attempted to give a more influential voice to its citizens; thanks to the Citizens Initiative, one million citizens from a number of Member States have the possibility to call on the Commission to bring forward new policy proposals. Only time will tell if this policy has the desire effect, but if it would have to be an unexpectedly successful policy for it to make any real impact with regards to voter enthusiasm for the EU. In conclusion, whether there is a democratic deficit depends partly on how the EU is understood. If it viewed as a Federation, or has a desire to turn into one, in that case the necessary links between citizens and the EU institutions are indeed weak. But if it is viewed as a confederation, then the links are unusually strong (McCormick, 2008, p126). indispensable links connecting citizens and EU institutions are certainly too frail; however, if understood as a confederation then the links are remarkably tight; where they are only expected to be indirect with national governments representing their citizens at the central authority. There may well be a persuasive case claim that the EU is not deficient with regards to democratic practices or formal legitimacy, but a question mark does linger over the unions social capacity. Democratic or not, the EU doesnt yet seem to have won over the hearts and minds of its citizens'(Smith, Julia, 2003, p3); meaning that no new constitution will on its own solve the problem of a democratic deficit within the EU. Why Was Marie Antoinette So Hated? Why Was Marie Antoinette So Hated? Assess the arguments raised by Zweig, Fraser, Lever, Dunlop, Amand as to why Marie Antoinette became such a hated figure? The following will assess and discuss the arguments raised by Zweig, Fraser, Lever, Dunlop and Amand as to why Marie Antoinette became such a hated figure in France before, during and after the revolution of 1789. The arguments of these historians will raise common and different factors that contributed to the unpopularity of Louis XVI’s Austrian born wife. The arguments raised by Zweig, Fraser, Lever, Dunlop and Amand could also be used to assess the hatred aimed towards Marie Antoinette and the effect this had upon the stability of the Ancien Regime in France. The factors and arguments that these historians have raised about Marie Antoinette are based around her personal qualities and faults, as well as upon political, social, and economic factors that were arguably outside her direct control. The assessment of the arguments raised will go into greater detail than whether Marie Antoinette became such a hated figure in France just because she was an Austrian and she had advis ed her poorer subjects to eat cakes when they did not have any bread. Above all else the arguments that are assessed will demonstrate whether her position as a hated figure was based upon justifiable reasons, fact or misplaced perceptions of her influence on events and her role within the monarchy. Marie Antoinette’s marriage to Louis XVI had been a diplomatic and dynastic match that had been intended to maintain peace between France and the Habsburg Empire, political motives came ahead of popularity amongst the French people. Like all royal families during the 18th century, the Bourbon dynasty in France did not believe its future depended on its public popularity or whether its Queen was a hated figure. Stefan Zweig argued that the reasons behind Marie Antoinette being a hated figure in France were due to her personal faults, her perceived arrogance and lavishness, combined with a dislike of her husband and declining respect for the monarchy itself. Zweig argued that Marie Antoinette’s emergence as a figure of hatred was strongly related to her being Austrian. As already noted she had been married to Louis XVI to seal the alliance between France and Austria. France had been the enemy of Austria for the best part of three hundred years; a great deal of hatred towards the Habsburgs still persisted in France. It was only natural that hatred should be directed towards Marie Antoinette once she married Louis XVI. Louis XVI himself was not believed to like Austria or Austrians with the exception of his wife. The Queen’s popularity was not helped by the failure to have children at the early stages of her marriage, although that was due to the King’s medical condition, rather than disliking his wife. Throughout her time in France though her Austrian birth did not help her popularity (Zweig, 1932 p.21). Zweig argued that Marie Antoinette inadvertently made herself a hated figure by influencing royal and therefore government policy. Here was a case in which the public perception of her influence was greater than her actual influence. Although that was because previous Queens had virtually influence at all. Louis XVI was more prone to influence from his wife than previous French Kings’ had been by their wives. Interfering in state affairs did not endear the Queen to her subjects, especially those that wanted reform. Marie Antoinette’s interference in politics may have been carried out with good intentions, yet it proved disastrous for the French monarchy. From the start many suspected that Marie Antoinette would only interfere to serve her selfish interests or those of Austria. As opposition to the monarchy increased, the number of people that were prepared to believe that Marie Antoinette’s interventions in government were either inept or directly contrary to Fre nch interests also increased. Marie Antoinette did not intervene in politics as frequently or as successfully as her opponents believed or stated she did. At the end of the day once her children had been born she wished to concentrate on her role as a mother, although her position as Queen meant that she was not able to do so (Zweig, 1932 p. 144). Zweig argued that Marie Antoinette helped to make herself a hated figure due to the lavish lifestyle she led. The Queen enjoyed a luxurious standard of living and liked to appear very wealthy. Marie Antoinette was regarded as being frivolous, fun loving and even uncaring. People grew to hate the displays of wealth and believed she knew little and cared even less about the harsh conditions that the poor had to endure. The Queen did her popularity no favours with allegations and rumours concerning her love life. Respect for her and the monarchy was weakened by such rumours. Her relationship with Fersen was far from discreet with questions raised about the paternity of her children. There were also rumours about affairs with other men including an Archbishop (Zweig, 1932 p. 144). The Queen’s reputation was severely damaged by the ‘Diamond Necklace Affair’, although she did not do anything wrong the verdicts and testimonies heard at the Paris Parlement were disastrous (Zweig, 1932 p. 170). Zweig argued that the faults of Marie Antoinette and the well-publicised rumours or the intrigues of those that disliked her made her hated. However, these factors would not have proved catastrophic if circumstances had been different. Unfortunately for the Queen all circumstances conspired against her. Poor harvests, the failure to reform the economy combined with government insolvency, the return of veterans from the American War of Independence, and finally a weak King proved a recipe for revolution. Zweig contends that these events and factors were critical in turning Marie Antoinette from being unpopular with some of the people into a woman hated by a majority of the people (Zweig, 1932 p. 156). Antonia Fraser put forward the arguments that Marie Antoinette’s decline from popularity to been a figure of hatred were due partly to how she was perceived by the French public and also due to circumstances beyond her control. Fraser argues that the French disliking foreign-born princesses and Queens had been customary before Marie Antoinette married the future Louis XVI. Previous princesses and Queens though had the advantage of maintaining a lower profile than Marie Antoinette did, whilst Louis XIV and Louis XV were more forceful than the indecisive Louis XVI was. The flamboyant Marie Antoinette stood out from her reserved husband; from her arrival in France she attracted both admirers and detractors. Unfortunately for her the ridicule and dislike that some regarded her with turned into being hated by the masses (Fraser, 2001 p. 44). Fraser points out that Marie Antoinette should have taken her mother’s advice to behave impeccably, obey her husband, and give no cause for scandal or rumours. Marie Theresa believed that avoiding scandal was the best way for her daughter to remain popular and not become a hated figure. The Empress also believed that Marie Antoinette could serve Habsburg interests more effectively if she was a popular Queen. The future Queen was also advised not to get too close to her future subjects, least they lose respect for her and the French monarchy. Whilst Marie Antoinette could keep away from her subjects, her knack of getting embroiled in scandal or upsetting people without intending to do so contributed to her becoming a hated figure. Fraser does note that Marie Theresa was partly to blame for some of her daughter’s faults. Marie Antoinette’s ability to be a good and successful Queen was hampered by a lack of education. She did not always know how to act like a Queen should, neither could she deal with complicated political issues. When she arrived in France she was naà ¯ve in many respects about politics and courtly intrigues (Fraser, 2001 p. 46). Marie Antoinette did not keep herself free of scandal and rumour. Such court rumours and tabloid pamphlets turned her innocent activities at court into orgies that never took place and the widespread circulation of them could not be prevented. Pamphlets that originally contained unfounded gossip would later prove more damaging in making her a hated figure. Louis XVI attempted to have such publications banned, although censorship was bypassed by using Dutch and British presses (Fraser, 2001, pp. 134-35). For a time after the birth of her eldest son, Marie Antoinette seemed to have achieved a measure of popularity amongst her subjects. The pamphleteers continued to try to undermine her popularity by spreading rumours about the child’s paternity and later the paternity of her other children. The motives of pamphleteers would change from making profits to attacking the monarchy and making the Queen hated (Fraser, 2001, pp.178-79). The Queen did not help matters by buying the palace at Saint Cloud for the royal family to live in; this showed insensitivity during a time when people were suffering from worsening economic conditions. People were shocked about how much was spent on the palace, the actual amounts spent was high enough yet rumours about its costs dented the Queen’s popularity further. Those that knew how precarious the royal finances were regarded it as unjustified expenses. Others regarded it as being another sign of Marie Antoinette’s power over the King and her pretensions to hold power in her own right. The Queen simply believed that the purchase was needed for her expanding family (Fraser, 2001, p.203). Fraser argues that Marie Antoinette’s reputation never recovered from the Diamond Necklace Affair, in which Cardinal de Rohan had been tricked into buying a necklace supposedly for the Queen. The Parlement in Paris reached verdicts that punished the conspirators, yet their testimonies tarnished Marie Antoinette’s reputation, even though she was cleared of any wrong doing (Fraser, 2001, p.225). Marie Antoinette became a hated figure amongst the nobility due to her being blamed for the monarchy’s financial deficits. Fraser however, argues that the Queen was not to blame for the spending cuts and the reduction in the number of prestigious court positions (Fraser, 2001, p.236). Fraser mentions that a factor that made Marie Antoinette a hated figure was that people had no qualms about expressing their hatred for the Queen, whilst they still felt unable to say things about the King (Fraser, 2001, p.251). The dislike of Marie Antoinette would further increase after Austria, Prussia, and Britain went to war against France. The Queen was still disliked for being foreign, which was coupled with the fear that the armies of Austria and Prussia could restore the monarchy which meant that the republican regime wished to execute her (Fraser, 2001, p.383). Marie Antoinette was executed following a show trial in which the charges against her were almost entirely false. She acquitted herself well; her spirited denials that she had never abused her son met approval in the court, although she had no hope of being acquitted in such a biased trial. Her execution was meant to symbolise that the monarchy would never return (Fraser, 2001, p.425). Evelyne Lever presents Marie Antoinette in largely favourable terms, particularly when putting forward the arguments as to why the Queen became such a hated figure in France. Lever argues that Marie Antoinette inadvertently began the process of being a hated figure by not realising how to behave at the Court of Versailles. Whilst Louis XV was still alive the future Queen had attempted to snub his mistress Madame Du Barry, only to be told by her mother to stop, in order to influence the King. She also set powerful noble families against her by not paying them enough respect (Lever, 2000, pp. 42-43). Lever notes that Marie Antoinette was popular in Paris before she became Queen, for her beauty and her good -humoured nature (Lever, 2000, p.52). Lever argued that a cause of Marie Antoinette becoming a hated figure was that Louis XVI did not have mistresses. In previous reigns the King’s mistresses were frequently detested and blamed for unpopular government decisions. Mistresses were usually scapegoats for the King, if Louis XVI had a mistress then perhaps she would have become hated instead of the Queen. Marie Antoinette was instead detested and used as a scapegoat for her husband’s faults and policies as well as her own actions (Lever, 2000, p.64). Marie Antoinette’s busy social life in the early years of her husband’s reign attracted much attention and criticism. The Queen gave a great deal of scope for gossip and those that wished to spread more malicious rumours had ample opportunities to do so (Lever, 2000, pp.110-11). Marie Antoinette lost respect and gave people cause to hate with her behaviour and attitudes. For instance: gambling was a frequent event, especially in the early years of her being Queen (Lever, 2000, p. 119). Marie Antoinette became a hated figure, especially amongst the poor, due to the amount of money she spent. Lever cites the cost of changing the Trianon Gardens, the expense of dances and fetes, as well as the provision of royal pensions to her closest friends and other hangers on (Lever, 2000, p.121). Marie Antoinette did not choose her friends wisely, nor try to limit the dangers of ignoring powerful families or stopping the spreading of rumours. The Queen did not use her patronage sensibly, for instance: the Comtesse de Polignac’s friends and family were given honours and pensions for doing services to the Queen of France yet doing nothing good for their country (Lever, 2000, p.160). Ian Dunlop presents a more sympathetic view of Marie Antoinette than most historians including the other four whose arguments are assessed here. Dunlop stresses that Marie Antoinette’s faults usually receive more attention than her attributes have done, that she was in fact more capable than her contemporaries often admitted, or historians have given her credit for. Dunlop comments upon the initial popularity of Marie Antoinette in France, particularly in Paris. She was originally regarded as having the qualities that a Queen needed. She was beautiful, loyal to the King and she looked the part. Her expensive clothes and lifestyle were not viewed with horror at that point (Dunlop, 1993, p.146). However, Marie Antoinette’s initial popularity declined for various reasons. Along with Louis XVI, the aristocracy and the higher clergy, Marie Antoinette lived in luxury, whilst many French people faced poverty and harsh living conditions. Although the Queen’s extravagance had not been widely resented at the start of her husband’s reign, it contributed to a growing hatred of Marie Antoinette as economic conditions went from bad to worse to disastrous. Opposition to the monarchy had the chance to be heard with the first gathering of the States General since 1614 in 1789. For the Queen it also coincided with the death of her eldest son. Such was the desperation of the political situation that the royal family gained no sympathy for the loss and faced increasing hostility (Dunlop, 1993 p.254). The monarchy and the French State headed towards bankruptcy due to the failure to achieve economic reforms and the costs of supporting the American War of Independence. The monarchy’s near bankruptcy was coupled with a series of bad harvests, which meant that more French people found it harder to survive. Marie Antoinette still appeared to be excessively privileged and wealthy to the poor that could not afford to feed themselves. The Queen became a h ated figure due to the fact she could still eat as much as she wished. Poverty and jealousy fuelled hatred, not only of Marie Antoinette but also the King, the aristocracy and the higher clergy. The claim that she said the poor should eat cake if they could not afford bread appears to have been made up. However the believe that she said it maximised the number of people that hated her (Dunlop 1993 p.258). Dunlop argues that the belief that Marie Antoinette interfered with how France was ruled contributed to her becoming such a hated figure. Dunlop argues that Marie Antoinette had tried to keep out of politics and concentrate solely on being the Queen consort. When she did become involved it was to protect her family’s interests and in her view those of France. To supporters and detractors of the monarchy the Queen was seen as more capable than her weak and indecisive husband was. Opponents of the crown targeted the Queen, their propaganda greatly contributed to her growth as a hated figure. The desperate poor, especially in Paris, readily accepted that their Austrian Queen was misguiding the King to feather her own nest at their expense. The fact that Marie Antoinette was Austrian reinforced their perceptions that she was an enemy of France and to blame for their plight. After the revolution radicals promoted campaigns against the Queen, they saw her as a danger to change. Her links to the Habsburgs meant that if she lived she could attempt to restore the monarchy with foreign help (Dunlop 1993 p. 385). Amand’s arguments concerning the unpopularity and hatred of Marie Antoinette can be regarded as being more traditional in stance than the others assessed simply because his book first appeared in 1891. Amand’s biography also differs from the other historians mentioned above as he was only writing about the events of 1792 and 1793. Amand argued that the hatred of Marie Antoinette was a significant factor in the fall of the French monarchy as she was hated more than the King. That hatred had been fuelled by years of negative rumours and propaganda against the Queen. The Queen’s weaknesses had contributed to some of those rumours whilst elements of the revolutionary movement were highly skilled in turning the population against her. This was the period in which the hatred of the French masses towards their Queen reached its fatal conclusion. The facts that France was at war with Marie Antoinette’s native Austria further antagonised the revolutionary elements of the French population against her. She was widely regarded as being a traitor, which further intensified her being a hated figure. Marie Antoinette could be stripped of her crown, her wealth, and all her titles, yet she would always remain an Austrian (Amand, 1891). Amand argued that Marie Antoinette became a hated figure due to the wealth and extravagance that she had formally displayed. Revolutionary propaganda portrayed her as been rich, selfish, and uncaring. Her unpopularity was promoted by jealousy and poverty. Hearsay and rumours were more important than fact in making her a hated figure. The Queen arguably made herself a hated figure by attempting to persuade the King to take decisive action. Radicals believed Marie Antoinette alongside her brother-in-laws bore the main responsibility for Louis XVI trying to resist revolutionary change. However the King’s indecisiveness meant that consistent and successful counter-revolutionary policies were never fully implemented. The Queen’s position as a hated figure was increased whenever the King had tried to reverse the revolution. Perhaps the one act that sealed the fate of the monarchy was the attempt to escape France that resulted in the royal family’s capture at Varennes. That failure to escape meant the revolutionary government could accuse the King and Queen of treachery. Hating the Queen was therefore a revolutionary and patriotic duty (Amand, 1891). There are some convincing arguments as to why Marie Antoinette became such a hated figure in France. Her Austrian origins were always going to be a potential banana skin. France and the Habsburgs had a long history of war and rivalry; therefore it was not surprising that members of the royal family, the nobility and the French people did not always trust her. Mistrust of the Queen’s intentions and loyalty to France were frequently played upon by opponents of the monarchy in general as a means of targeting Marie Antoinette to increase her unpopularity. She was an unpopular and later a hated figure as it was believed she was serving Austria’s best interests rather than those of France. Although Marie Antoinette did try to influence French foreign policy to suit the Habsburgs interests, she was as the frequent complaints from Vienna attest, particularly ineffective at doing so. Of course, once the revolutionary France was at war with Austria, it further increased hate towa rds the Queen. Radical elements successfully took advantage of the fear that Marie Antoinette would use her family connections to reverse the revolution. The royal family’s unsuccessful escape bid meant that they were hated even more. Accusations of treachery and duplicity certainly made the Queen a detested figure. Opponents of the monarchy regarded Marie Antoinette as a figure to be hated, as they believed she was a threat to their ambitions of reform or revolution. They used propaganda, such as pamphlets to discredit her. Her private life allowed them to spread many rumours, although with the exception of Fersen these would appear to be unfounded. Perhaps the most damaging rumour was that she said ‘let them eat cake’ when grain was scarce and the cost of bread was too high for the poor. France’s severe financial problems certainly made a contribution to Marie Antoinette becoming a hated figure. Much more than that, these factors acted as a catalyst for revolution. The Queen could not be blamed for the bankruptcy of the Crown or food shortages, but all the factors noted already meant that a majority of the French population saw her as a scapegoat who needed to be punished before their lives would get any better. Her apparent greed, adultery, conservative political outlook, and the belief that she was looking after Austrian interests all combined to make her hated. In Marie Antoinette’s defence it has to be mentioned that she was not the cause of France’s long-term problems and that there was little she could have done to solve them. Louis XVI was a weak and indecisive man, completely unsuited to be a King. The cost of the Seven Years War and the American War of Independence were the main cause of the Crown’s crippling debts and not the Que en’s expenditure. The government was certainly unable to deal with food shortages, yet that was mainly due to the scale of the problem than deliberate neglect. As Queen, Marie Antoinette performed her main duties of being the King’s consort and producing heirs to the throne. After the revolution she attempted to protect her family’s position and later their lives. She acted in a way that the majority of her royal contemporaries did. She was hated as much for what she represented, as opposed to who she was. To conclude, Zweig, Fraser, Lever, Dunlop, and Amand present common and different arguments as to why Marie Antoinette became a hated figure. They all point out the Queen’s personal faults as important causes of her unpopularity. Zweig attempts to explain those faults by the argument that Marie Antoinette was just an ordinary woman that through the accidents of birth and marriage became the Queen of France in a period in which its monarchy faced many problems. Fraser, Dunlop, and Lever attempt to account for the Queen’s failings by pointing out that she was inadequately educated for her roles. Dunlop is sympathetic to Marie Antoinette in that he argues that circumstances conspired against her. Fraser, Lever, and Zweig are more critical of her shortcomings, although also sympathetic to her position. As Amand concentrated on the years 1792-1793 he argued that hatred of Marie Antoinette was promoted by the war against Austria, Prussia, and Britain. She was hated for trying to prevent the revolution destroying her family, even if she could not prevent the end of the monarchy. All the historians argued that Marie Antoinette was hated due to the rumours and propaganda that was spread against her. Before the revolution the government had tried to censor such publications. After the revolution, particularly once the monarchy was abolished, the revolutionary government targeted Marie Antoinette. Ironically enough, Marie Antoinette was a bigger political threat after Louis XVI was executed. Her trial featured all the crimes or errors she had committed since arriving in France, greed, immorality, treachery and being of foreign birth. Bibliography Dunlop I, (1993) Marie Antoinette, Sinclair Stevenson, London Fraser A (2001) Marie Antoinette, Weidenfeld Nicholson, London Lever E (2000) Marie Antoinette: The Last Queen of France Saint- Amand I (1891) Marie Antoinette and the Downfall of Royalty Zweig S, (1933) Marie Antoinette: The Portrait of an Average Woman